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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL McCARTHY, 
Plaintiff and AppeUant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, "THIS IS 
THE PLACE" MONUMENT COM-
MISSION, JOHN D. GILES, Execu-
tive Secretary and Treasurer of the 
said- Commission, and the following 
n1emhers thereof: ORVAL W. Case No. 8037 
ADAMS, MARRINER W. BROWN-
ING, GEORGE S. ECCLES, JOHN 
F. FITZPATRICK, J. L. FIRMAGE, 
EARLJ.GLADE,DUANE G.HUNT, 
AR·THUR W. MOULTON, GEORGE 
ALBERT SMITH, and TAYLOR 
WOOLEY, · 
Defend(JJYbts and Respo~dents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF· F1\C·TS 
This is an action to enforce payment for certain 
work done on the "This is the Place" Monument. It was 
brought in two causes of action, the first against th·e 
State, the second against the ''This is The Place" 
Monument Commission (also knuwn as ''This is The 
Place'' Monum·ent Committee) and the members indi-
vidually. Both causes seek to collect for the same charge. 
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The first cause of action (in which Plaintiff alleged 
that the "This is The Place" Monument commission is 
an agency of the State of Utah) was dismissed on motion 
of the State, on the ground that the State had not con-
sented to be sued. '~rhe second cause of action against 
the commission and the members of it, was later dis ... 
missed on the grounds that the issue raised was barred 
by the rule of res adjudicata, due to the fact that the 
same issue was presented to, and decided by, the United 
States District Court some years prior. 
The complaint in the Federal Court was amended 
twice, the case being submitted on the second amended 
complaint (Tr. 149), the Answer and Counterclaim (Tr. 
134), the Reply (Tr. 124), and the Stipulation of F'acts 
(Tr. 126), and was decided as shown by Memorandum 
decision (Tr. 123). The Commission was sued as a volun-
tary association throughout (Tr. 184, 165, 149) and judg-
ment was sought against it and its members. The mem-
bers of the Commission or Committee were individually 
named as defendants in the Amended (Tr. 165) and 
Second Amended Complaints (Tr. 149). 
The second cause of action of the case at bar is 
almost a word-for-word copy of the second amended 
complaint, in the Federal Court, the one on which the 
Plaintiff went to trial and judgment in said Federal 
Court. 
It was contended by the plaintiff throughout the 
Federal Court case that the Commission was a voJuntary 
association while the defendants claimed it was an agency 
of the State of Utah. The latter was contended in 
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1notions to dismiss 'vhich were filed in the Federal Court 
to each of the pleadings, the Complaint, the Amended 
Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint (Tr. 184, 
165, 149). It was also urged in Paragraph I of the initial 
answer and in paragraphs I and II of the Affirmative 
Defense therein, that the Con1rnission was an agency of 
the State of TTtah. Almost the same words were used 
in the Ans,ver and Counter-Clairn filed in the Federal 
Court on December 13, 1948, to the Second Amended 
Co1nplaint wherein the first two affirmative defens.es 
submitted \Vere these : 
"I 
"That· this court has no jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of this action for the reason that the matter 
involved herein is not a controversy bet\veen citizens of. 
different states in this that this suit is in fact against 
the State of Utah and the State of Utah is not a citizen 
of any state within the n1eaning and intent of the law 
defined under this Court's jurisdiction. 
"II 
"That this Court has no jurisdiction over the persons 
of these defendants for the reason that the "This is the 
Place" Monument Commission is an agency of the State 
of Utah, and the individual Defendants are sued in their 
representative capacity as Executive Secretary and 
Treasurer and as members thereof; and that the matter 
involved is therefore one in which the State of Utah is 
primarily concerned and that the State of Utah only is 
concerned with and will be affected by any judgment 
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rendered herein and that therefore the action is essenti-
' ally an action against the State of Utah." 
These issues were submitted to the Court upon Stipu-
lation (Tr. 126) which opens with these words: 
"It is hereby stipulated by and between plaintiff and 
defendant the following are the facts upon which juris-
diction of this Court is claimed and denied." 
According to the order of the Federal Court (Tr~ 
123) the case can1e "on for hearing on the plea of the 
defendants set forth in the answer ... , 
"that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine the controversy and 
"lacks jurisdiction over the defendants ... 
"it is ordered that the plaintiff's complaint .. be .... 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." 
Lt will be observed that the case was, according to 
Judge Johnson's n1emorandum decision, submitted fol-
lowing the filing of the stipulation of facts and oral argu-
n1ent of counsel and upon the Court being fully advised 
as to the premises. In the case on appeal, the Affidavit 
of Irwin Clawson (Tr. 120) merely identifies the F:ederal 
Court transcript which followed. No answer to the Con1-
plaint was filed nor was any Affidavit filed to clarify 
or controvert' the Affidavit of the Plaintiff, for such 
would open up the matters concluded by the Federal 
Court decision. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE .·FEDERAL COURT HELD THAT THE COMMIS-
SION WAS AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
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POINT TWO 
THE FEDERAL COURT, IN HOLDING THAT THE COM-
~IISSION WAS AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
ALSO HELD THAT THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 
WERE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE. 
POINT THREE 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT ONE. 
SUBPOINT A. A JUDGlVIENT OF DISMISSAL FOR 
LA.CK OF JURISDICTION IS RES JUDICATA AS TO 'rHE 
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION, AND AS TO ALL ISSUES UPON 
\VHICH LACK OF JURISDICTION IS BASED. 
SUBPOINT B. A HEARING ON THE MERITS OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT PREVENTED BY THE 
LOWER COURT'S DECISION. 
POINT F·OUR 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT TWO. 
SUBPOINT A. EVEN IF THE FIRST COURT'S DECI-
SION IS ENTIRELY ERRONEOUS, IT IS STILL RES 
ADJUDICATA TO ANOTHER ACTION ON THE SAME 
CAUSE. 
SUBPOINT B. WHETHER DEFENDANT IS A COM-
1\IISSION OR A COMMITTEE MAKES NO DIFFERENCE. 
POINT FIVE 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT THREE. 
ON A CONTRACT MADE WITII A STATE AGENCY, 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO RIGHT TO liA VE LIABILITY UNDER 
IT DETERMINED BY A COURT. 
POINT ONE 
THE FEDERAL COURT HELD THAT THE COMMIS-
SION WAS AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
At the top of Page 15 of appellants brief, it is 
argued that since the F'ederal Court made no specific 
finding that the Com1nission \vas an agency of the State 
of Utah, that the judgment of dismissal on the grounds 
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of lack of jurisdiction could have been based on the lack 
of diversity of citizenship. Let us see if the facts bear 
this out. 
In the first paragraph of the answer to the first cause 
of action set forth in the plaintiff's Second Amended 
Complaint ( Tr. 86) in the Federal Court, the defendants 
admitted ". . . . that Plain tiff is a citizen and resident of 
the State of California, ..... Defendants further admit 
that the individuals named as defendants [which included 
all who are defendants and respondents in the case now 
on appeal before this Supreme Court] are members of 
'This is the Place' Monument Commission and that said 
tnembers are residents and citizens of the State of Utah." 
There was no dispute of fact as to whether the 
defendants were residents of another state than that of 
the plaintiff. The dispute was not whether the individual 
parties were citizens of different states, but whether the 
real defendant was not the State of Utah and if such was 
proven to be the case whether such real party at interest, 
the State of Utah, was a citizen within the meaning of 
the statute and the Constitution. That this was the real 
issue is shown by that san1e ans,ver in the affirmative 
defense ( Tr. 89) in the F'ederal Court wherein it is 
alleged: 
"I 
"That this court has no jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of this action for the reason that the matter 
involved herein is not a controversy between citizens of 
different states in this that this suit is in fact against 
the State of Utah and the State of Utah is not a citizen 
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of any state within the meaning and intent of the law 
defined under this court's jurisdiction. 
"II 
·~That this court has no juridiction over the persons 
of these defendants for the reason that the "This is the 
Place" ~Ionument Co1nnrission is an agency of the State 
of Utah and the individual Defendants are sued in their 
representative capacity as Executive S.ecretary and 
Treasurer and as· members thereof, and that the rnatter 
involved is therefore one in which the State of Utah is 
primarily concerned and that the State of Utah is con-
cerned wi'th and will be affected by any judgment ren-
dered herein and that therefore the action is essentially 
an action against the State of Utah. 
"III 
"That as to the individual Defendants, nothing is 
alleged or set forth from which the court could legally 
fix any responsibility upon, or render any judgment 
against, the individual defendants." 
There was no dispute about the diversity of resi-
dence as between the plaintiff on the one hand and the 
individual defendants on the other. That was not an 
issue. The issue of lack of jurisdiction of the defendants 
by the Federal Court was not as to individual parties, but 
as to the real parties at interest, the plaintiff on the 
one hand and the State of Utah on the other. 
That was the issue and the only issue as to juris-
diction. There is no mystery a.s to how the Federal Court 
reached its decision that it had no jurisdiction. There 
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wa.s but one step involved. If the individual defendants 
were the real parties at interest it was admitted that 
there was a diversity of citizenship and thus jurisdiction. 
If the State of Utah was the real party at interest there 
was no diversity of citizenship and the court had no 
jurisdiction. That was the sole point involved a.s to 
jurisdiction. That wa:s the point decided by the Federal 
Court. There is no difficulty in fathoming the reasoning 
of the Federal Court. There was no issue of lack of juris-
diction involved axcept that the commission and the 
individual n1embers thereof were or were not an agency 
of the State ot Utah. 
POINT TWO 
THE FEDERAL COURT, IN HOLDING THAT THE COM-
MISSION WAS AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
ALSO HELD THAT THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 
WERE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE. 
As pointed out above, the answer of these individual 
defendants in the Federal Court admitted that the plain-
tiff was a citizen and resident of California and that all 
of the individual defendants there (which includes those 
in the case at bar before the Supreme Court) were citi-
zens and residents of the State of Utah. It was also 
admitted that the amount involved in the suit exceeded 
$3000.00 (paragraph II, Tr. 86). So the only question 
relating to jurisdiction was whether the real defendant-
at-interest "\Vas the individual defendants or the State of 
Utah. 
To hold that the State of Utah was the real defend-
ant and to dismiss as to the individual defendants, who 
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admitted they were subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court, it \vas necessary for the later court to 
hold that the individual defendants were not personally 
liable on the obligation upon which suit was brought. 
That was a necessary step in holding that it (the Federal 
Court) had no jurisdiction, for unquestionably it had 
jurisdiction if the individual defendants were liable per-
sonally. 
Since the Federal Court passed on the question of 
whether these individual defendants were p-ersonally 
liable, can that issue be again litigated f 
·• ... a fact or question actually and directly in 
issue in a former suit, and there judicially passed 
on and determined by a court of competent juris-
diction, is conclusively settled, so far as concerns 
the parties and cannot be further litigated in a 
future action between them and their privies in 
the same or in another tribunal, upon the same or 
a different cause of action." In Re Evans 130 P. 
217, 225, 42 Utah 282. 
The question of the liability of the individual defend-
ants has been adjudicated once and the issue found for 
these defendants. It cannot be relitigated in the F'ederal 
or any state court. It has been judicially determined 
that the individual defendants· are not liable and ques-
tion cannot be relitigated without going contrary to the 
principal of res judicata. 
POINT THREE 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT ONE. 
SUBPOINT A. A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL FOR 
LACI{ OF JURISDICTION IS RES JUDICATA AS TO THE 
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ISSUE OF JURISDICTION, AND AS TO ALL ISSUES UPON 
WHICH LACK OF JURISDICTION IS BASED. 
It is urged that the judgment on the merits must 
be obtained for it to be res judicata. That is true so far 
as the merits are concerned. But it is not true that a 
judgment on the question of lack of jurisdiction is not 
conclusive and final as to the sufficiency or insufficiency 
of jurisdiction. 
Suppose thP plaintiff had filed again in the Federal 
Court on the same complaint, could he have relitigated 
the question of "',.hether or not the Federal Court had 
jurisdiction' 
Suppose instead of filing first in the F'ederal Court, 
the plaintiff had begun his action in the District Court 
for Salt Lake County, and in that case that court had 
found, as did Judge Johnson, that the Court lacked juris-
diction because the Co1nmission was a state agency and 
the state had not given its consent to be sued, could the 
plaintiff have thereupon filed a new case on the same 
complaint before the same court and again litigated the 
same issue of jurisdiction' Could he have "shopped 
around" among the six divisions of the court until he 
found a more acceptable legal climate' Or, having unsuc-
cessfully submitted his case to all six judges, could he 
still litigate the question of whether the Commission 
was an agency of the state, that is, the question of juris-
diction, before any new judge who might be appointed or 
elected' Would the litigation of the state agency ques-
tion only come to rest when the statute of limitations 
became a bar¥ 
10 
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The staten1ent of the problem eou1pels the answer, 
for if the plaintiff cannot continue to re-subn1it the san1e 
question over and over again to the judges until the 
limitations have run, then when is he barred~ Is it after 
each judge of the six and their successors have decided 
adversely~ If so why stop there~ vVhat rule of lavv 
\vould make any successive decision a bar if the first one 
did not f Obviously such is not the law. This Court has 
spoken on the matter thusly: 
''. . . The doctrine is a principle of repose, and 
is largely based upon and in accordance with the 
1naxim that no one ought to be twice vexed for 
one and the same cause; and, as stated by Wells 
in his vvork on I~es Adjudicata (section 2), chiefly 
bears upon the parties and others privy to the 
i1nmediate parties, and restrains them from liti-
gating anew such matters as have previously been 
dra\vn into controversy between them or those· 
representing the1n, and have been authoritatively 
decided by a competent tribunal. Hence the oft-
repeated declaration that a fact or question actu-
ally and directly in issue in a former suit, and 
there judicially passed on and determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively 
~ettled, so far as concerns the parties, and cannot 
be further litigated in a future action between 
them or their privies, in the same or in anoth-er 
tribunal, upon the same or a different cause of 
action." In R-e Evans, 130 P. 217, 225; 42 Utah 
282, Mr. J-ustice Straup speaking for the Court. 
The same doctrine was subsequently affirmed by 
this court in Mathews vs. Mathews, in these words : 
" 'The judgment of a court of concurrent 
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, 
11 
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a bar or as evidence, conclusive, between the 
sarne 'parties, upon the sarne rna tter directly in 
question in another court'. 15 RCL 951, Sec. 429. 
" 'The foundation principle upon which the 
doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought 
not to be permitted to litigate the san1e issue 
rnore than once; that, when a right or fact has 
been judicially tried and determined by a court 
of cornpetent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for 
such trial has been given, the judgment of the 
court, so long as it rernains unreversed, should be 
conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity 
with them in law or estate .... Public policy and 
the interest of litigants alike require that there 
be an end to litigation, and the peace and order of 
society demand that matters distinctly put L: 
issue and determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction as to parties and subject matter shall 
not .be retried between the same parties in any 
subsequent suit in any court.' 15 RCL 953, Sec 
430" Mathews vs. Mathews, 132 P. 2nd 111, 114; 
102 Utah 428. 
"In stating the doctrine of res judicata, the 
courts usually refer to the fact that the judgment 
sought to be used as a basis of the doctrine was 
rendered upon the merits, since it is a general rule 
that a judginent rendered on any grounds which 
do not involve the 1nerits of the action rnay not 
be used as a basis for the operation of the doctrine 
of res judicata. Under this rule, an adjudication 
on grounds purely technical, where the merits 
cannot come into question, is limited to the point 
actually decided, and does not preclude the main-
tenance of a subsequent action brought in a way 
to avoid the objection which proved fatal in the· 
first action. A.s to the technical point decided, 
however, the judgment is CQnclusive, even though 
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it is not conclusive as to the m.erits of the enti.re 
controversy." (emphasis added) 30 Am. Jur. 944, 
Sec. 208. 
"A dismissal for want of jurisdiction is con-
clusive of the fact of want of jurisdiction, but it 
is no adjudication of the merits and will not bar 
another action for the same cause." 50 C.J.S. 72, 
S-ee. 638. 
Freeman has this to say on the subject : 
~'Questions of jurisdiction may become res 
judicata the same as any other matters of law or 
fact where they are properly in issue or are n-ece:s-
sarily involved and determined." 2 Freeman on 
Judgments (5 Ed.) Sec. 710. (emphasis added). 
This narrower application of the principal of res 
judicata is discussed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the Forsyth case as follows : 
''Though the form and causes of action be ·dif-
ferent, a decision by a court of competent juris-
diction in respect to any essential fact or question 
in the one action in conclusive between the parties 
in all subsequent actions. Cromwell vs. Sac 
County, 94 U. S. 351 (24 :195); Mason Lumber Co. 
vs. Buchtel, 101 U. S. 638 (25 :1074); Stout vs. 
Lye, 103 U. S. 66 ( 26 :428) ; Nesbitt vs. Riverside 
Independent Dist., 144 U. S. 610 (36 :562); John-
son Co. vs. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252 (38 :429); Last 
Chance Min. Co. vs. Tyler Thtiin. Co. 157 U. S. 683 
(39 :859)." Forsyth vs. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506, 
41 L. Ed. 1095 at 1100. 
The same subject was treated by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in the following language: 
"The general principle· announced in numer-
ous cases is that a right, question, or fact dis-
13 
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tinctly put in issue and directly detern1ined by a 
court of co1npetent jurisdiction, as a ground of 
recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit 
between the san1e parties or their privies; and 
even if the second suit is for a different cause 
of action, the right, question, or fact once so 
deter1nined must as, between the same parties or 
their privies, be taken as conclusively established, 
so long as the judgment in the first suit remains 
unmodified." Southern Pacific R. Co. vs. United 
States, J 68 U. S. 1, 48; 42 L. Ed. 355, 377; 18 S. 
Ct. 18. 
The precise point of a decision on a question of juris-
diction was decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Baldwin vs. Iowa State Traveling 
Men's Asso., 283 U. S. 522; 75 L. ed. 1244, 51 s .. Ct. 517; 
where Baldwin brought an action in Missouri and the 
defendant con1pany appeared specially and objected to 
the jurisdiction. The court over-ruled the objection and 
the company permitted the trial to proceed without fur-
ther appearance. The plaintiff then sued in Iowa on the 
judgment obtained in the Missouri ease and the company 
attempted to again litigate the issue of jurisdiction of 
the Missouri Court. The United States Court in Iowa 
upheld the company's contention that the Missouri Court 
had no jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals did also, 
but the Supreme Court held that the company had sub-
mitted that issue to the Missouri Court and its decision 
was res judicata.. The latter court said: 
"The substantial matter for determination is 
whether the judgment amounts to res judicata- on 
the question of the jurisdiction of the court_which 
rendered it over the person of the respondent ..... 
14 
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The special appearance gives point to the fact 
that the respondent entered the Missouri court 
for the very purpose of litigating the question of 
jurisdiction oYer its person. It had the election 
not to appear at all. If, in the absence of appear-
ance, the court had proceeded to judgment and 
the present suit had been brought thereon, 
respondent could have raised and tried out the 
issue in the present action, because it would never 
have had its day in court with respect to juris-
diction. (Citations) It had also the right to appeal 
from the decision of the Missouri District Court 
as is shown by Harkness vs. Hyde 98 U. S. 476, 25 
L. EL:. 237, supra and the other authorities cited. 
It elected to follow neither of those courses, but, 
after having been defeated upon full hearing in 
its contention as to jurisdiction, it took no further 
steps, and the judgment in question resulted. 
'"Public policy dictates that there be an end 
of litigation; that those who have contested an 
issue shall be botuld by the result of the ·contest, 
and that matters once tried shall be considered 
forever settled as betweei1 the parties. We see 
no reason why this doctrine should not apply in 
every case where one voluntarily appears, pre-
sents his case and is fully heard, and why he 
should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter 
concluded by the judg-.t:nent of the tribunal to which 
he has subn1itted his cause." 
In Ripperger vs. A. C. Allyn & Co., 113 F. 2nd. 332-t 
where the first action was disn1issed (on defendant's 
motion) for lack of jurisdiction, and then a second action 
was begun, the plaintiff appealed and admitted that a 
decision in favor of jurisdiction was res judicata, the 
court noted that fact and then states (333): 
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"But he advances the contention that a deci-
sion tha.t jurisdiction is lacking leaves the parties 
as though no action had ever been brought and 
therefore presents no bar to a subsequent action 
even in the san1e court. We think the argrnnent 
ingenious but unsound. As Mr. Justice Brandeis 
remarked in American Surety Co. vs. Baldwin, 
supra ( 287 U. S. 156, 53 S. Ct. 101, 77 L. Ed. 231, 
86 A. L. R. 298): 
"'The principles of res judicata apply to 
questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues. 
No reason is apparent why the rule should be less 
applicable to a decision denying jurisdiction than 
to one sustaining it.'" 
''Decisions on mere questions of law do not 
operate as res judicata when divorced from the 
particular subject matter to which the law was 
applied, though they may be followed as prece-
dents under the doctrine of stare decisis. But 
where the parties and the matter to be determined 
are identical the former adjudication is res jndi:-
cata ·and conclusive of the la'v as applied to that 
matter, even though it is afterwards determined 
that the law was erroneously adjudicated or 
applied." 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) 
S·ec. 709. 
Now returning to the point raised above in the 
quoted portions of American Jurisprudence, Corpus 
Juris Secundum and many of the authorities referred to, 
the judgment of dismissal because of lack of jurisdiction, 
while not res judicata. of the merits of the case, is con-
clusive as to the matters upon which the ruling of no 
jurisdiction is based. As American Juris prudence says 
at another point: 
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"'Ho,vever the sueeessful maintenance of a 
second action on a different cause of action may 
be precluded by a prior conclusive adjudication 
a~ to a particular issue involved in both actions." 
30 An1. J ur. 916, Soo. 172. 
In United Shoe vs. U. S., 258 U. S. 451, 66 L. Ed. 708 
at 718, the court treated of this subject in these words: 
"'In other words, to determine the effect of a 
former judg1nent pleaded as an estoppel, two 
questions must be answered: (1) Was the former 
judgment rendered on the same cause of action~ 
(2) if not, was some n1atter litigated in the former 
suit detern1inative of a matter in controversy in 
the second suit"? To answer these questions we 
must look to the pleadings making the issues, and 
&-x;anline the record to determine the questions 
essential to the decision of the former contro-
versy." 
Appellant cites the case of Gihson vs. Utah State 
Teachers' Retirement Board, 105 P. 2nd 353, 99 Utah 576, 
to sustain his claim that a dismissal for lack of juris-
diction is not res judicata. 
The Gibson case in the Supreme Court was brought 
to obtain a writ of mandamus. In the prior case in· the 
lower court, Gibson sued under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act. The first case was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. According to the Gibson case decision in the 
Supreme Court, no finding or determination was rnade 
in District c·ourt as to the status of the plaintiff, but an 
order was entered dismissing the action "presumably on 
the ground of lack of jurisdiction since that was the 
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only issue raised or heard there," according to the 
Supreme Court decision. It then continued as follows: 
"Such action was, and is, not res judicata." Evidently 
there was no holding by the District Court that the plain-
tiff in that case was or was not a teacher covered by th~ 
Retirement Act. Can it be said that such a decision as 
that of the District Court, which refuses to decide either 
one way or the other, was res judicata of the issues there 
presented' To have held the Supreme Court was 
estopped by the decision of the District Court was to 
read into the District Court decision something which. 
was not there. The Supreme Court could not hold the 
District Court decision was binding when it decided 
none of the issues presented by the complaint. However, 
if the question of jurisdiction of the District Court had 
been important in the upper court, then the' District 
Court decision would have been binding under the doc-
trine of res judicata. But such was not the case·. Hence 
the upper court felt and held that, as to the issues pre-
sented in the application for the writ of mandate, the 
decision of the lower court holding that it had no juris-
diction, was not con trolling. 
It is submitted that the decision that the court 'vas 
without jurisdiction of the case in the Federal Court 
because the Commission was a state agency and because 
the individual defendants were not personally liable is 
binding on the lower court in the case at bar when the 
question of state agency and personal liability is again 
involved. 
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SUBPOINT B. A HEARING ON THE MERITS OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAil\ti IS NOT PREVENTED BY THE 
LOWER COURT'S DECISION. 
The Federal Court did not attempt to pass on the 
1nerits of the Plaintiff's claim but only on the narrow 
question of 'vho was liable for any claim that existed. 
That Court held that the individual members of the Com-
Inission 'vere not liable because the Commission was a 
state agency. Whether the plaintiff had or had not per-
formed his contract was not decided. The same thing was 
true of the decision in the low court in the case at bar, 
the merits were left unaffected. The plaintiff can still 
pursue his remedy before the State Board of Examiners 
and have the merits of the claim passed on by that body. 
But he has no right to have his claim adjudicated by a 
court, 'vhether state or federal. This is true in any 
contract with the state. And the F·ederal Court deter-
mined that, since the Commission was a state agency, 
it could not be brought to bar. S-o plaintiff's assumption . 
in his Point One that he has the right to litigate the 
n1erits of his claim before a court, is erroneous. 
POINT F:OUR 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT TWO. 
SUBPOINT A. EVEN IF THE FIRST COURT'S DECI-
SION IS ENTIRELY ERRONEOUS, IT IS STILL RES 
AD.JUDICATA TO ANOTHER ACTION ON THE SAME 
CAUSE. 
In Appellant's Point Two it is argued that the Third 
District Court erred in its decision because the allegation 
of the Plaintiff is his c·omplaint and Affidavit were 
uncontroverted. It is not claimed anywhere that the 
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cause as presented to the Third Judicial District Court 
against the Commission and against the members thereof 
is not the identical case which was presented to the 
United States District Court. Nor could it be so asserted 
for, as shown above, the second cause of action, the one 
before the lower court on this hear.ing, is almost a word-. 
for-word copy of the second amended complaint in the 
Federal Court case, the one on which the sarne parties 
submitted the same issues on an agreed statement of 
facts before Judge Tillman D. Johnson. 
It is argued in Point Two by Appellant that the Com-
mission was not an agency of the state, but a voluntary 
association. This is the same issue which was presented to 
the Federal Court. That court ruled against the appe~­
lant. Nevertheless, let us assume for the sake of argu-
ment, that the F'ederal Court was 100% wrong in its 
ruling on the cause as submitted on the stipulated facts. 
Would that make any difference~ 
"These decisions constitute application of the 
general and well settled rule that a judgment, not 
set aside on appeal or otherwise, is equally effec-
tive as an estoppel upon the points decided, 
whether the decision be right or wrong. Cornett 
vs. Williams, 20 Wall. 226, 249, 250, 22 LEd. 254, 
258, 259; Wilson vs. Deen, 121 U. S. 525, 534, 30 
L. Ed. 980, 982, 7 S. Ct. 1004 ; Chicago, R. I. & P. 
R. c·o. vs. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 617, 70 L. Ed. 
757, 762, 53 A.L.R. 1265, 46 S. Ct. 420~ 26 N.C.C.A. 
971. The indulgence of a contrary view would 
result in creating elements of uncertainty and in 
undermining the conclusive character of judg-
Inents, consequences \vhich it was the very pur-
pose of the doctrine of res judicata to avert." 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l~eed vs. Allen, :2~6 lT.S. 191, 76 L. Ed. 1054, 52 
S. Ct. 532, 81 A.L.R. 703, Mr. Justice Sutherland 
speaking for the Court. 
- H In this connection, it is declared that the 
doctrine of res judicata is not dependent upon the 
correctness of the judgment, or of the verdict or 
finding on \Yhich it is based." 30 Am. J ur. 939, 
Sec. 198. To sa1ne effect, 50 C. J. S. 159. 
SUBPOINT B. WHETHER DEFENDANT IS A COM-
l\IISSION OR A COTh'IlVIITTEE J.\IIAKES NO DIFFERENCE. 
It is suggested that there is some help to be obtained 
for Appellant fron1 the fact that the body set up by the 
State was a Committee while the one sued is called a 
Commission. vVhat difference does it make~ In the 
case at bar it is alleged in the Complaint, "That the 
defendant Cormnission is a voluntary association .... " 
and four lines below that "defendant is also kno,vn as 
.... Committee." (Tr. 4) Plaintiff alleges that they are 
one and the same. That is not controverted. What of the 
play in the Brief revolving around the two~ Does the 
Plaintiff no'v wish to prove that they are not one and the 
same after having alleged they are~ 
Whether the Commission or Committee properly 
pursued their authority so as to obtain the approval of 
the State Building Board, or not, or to let building con-
tracts without the approval of the Department of Engi-
neering or Finance Commission, etc., cannot effect the 
issue now. They were matters to be raised in the Federal 
Court and they were. The stipulation (Tr. 126) of agreed 
facts filed in the Federal Court goes into those matters 
in even more detail than does appellant's brief. All of 
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those things were considered by Judge Tillman D. John-
son when he decided that the Commission was a state 
agency. Can the plaintiff, having lost on that issue in 
the Federal Court, raise it again in that or another 
court~ The authorities cited above deny that right. Why 
should those issues, having been fully presented and 
argued, and submitted to the Federal Court, be again 
relitigated in the State Court~ 
POINT FIVE 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT THREE. 
ON A CONTRACT MADE VliTH A STATE AGENCY, 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO RIGHT TO HAVE LIABILITY UNDER 
IT DETERMINED BY A COURT. 
Plaintiff in concluding says he is entitled to have 
his claim adjudicated by the lower court. But in this, we 
submit, he is mistaken. There is no such right. "The 
state cannot be sued unless it has given its consent or 
has waived its immunity," State vs. District Court, 78 P. 
2nd 502, 504, 94 Utah 384; Wilkinson vs. State, 134 P. 
626, 631, 42 Utah 483; Campbell vs. State Road Com-
mission, 70 P. 2nd 857, 95 Utah 242. 
This rule has already been acknowledged in the case 
at bar and, in the absence of an allegation in the Com-
plaint that the State has submitted, the action against 
the State of Utah has been dismissed. 
The plaintiff has mistaken his remedy. It lies and 
always has been, before the State Board of Examiners. 
For some reason he seems loath to seek his redress there, 
but that is where his remedy and reimbursement lies, if 
he is entitled to any. 
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And having once submitted to a Court his claim of a 
right to hold the individual members of the Commission, 
he cannot relitigate the same issue again. His right to 
recover remained unimpaired by the Federal Court deci-
sion and by the judgment from which he appealed, but 
not his right to claim individual liability. That point was 
fully litigated and disposed of in the Federal Court. It 
cannot again be brought into issue. 
It is subn1itted that the decision of the lower court 
m the case at bar was advisedly made and should be 
affirn1ed and this appeal dismissed. 
IRWIN CLAWSON, 
REX W. HARDY, 
Attorneys for "This Is The Place" Monu-
ment Commission, John D. Giles, Orval 
Adams, J. L. Firmage, Earl J. Glade, 
Duane G. Hunt, Arthur W. Moulton 
and Taylor Woolley. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Martiner W. Browning and 
George S. Eccles. 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & 
HENDERSON, 
Attorney,s for John F. Fitzpatrick 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General and 
ROBERT B. PORTER, 
Assistant Attorney General 
for the State of Utah. 
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